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FROM LAB BENCH TO INNOVATION: 
Critical Challenges to Nascent Academic Entrepreneurs 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
University research laboratories are important sources of the inventions and discoveries 
that become significant innovations with broad economic and societal impact. Invention 
alone is not innovation; innovation is the long, hard work of taking new technologies and 
bringing them to commercialization. There are many pathways for the dissemination of 
new knowledge that arises from basic research at universities, ranging from traditional 
methods such as publication and training students to licensing technology to 
established firms or new ventures.  
 
One way to transform new knowledge into valuable innovations is for university 
researchers to undertake the creation of new firms based on their discoveries through 
academic entrepreneurship. The problem is that university scientists and inventors with 
a discovery made at a laboratory bench face challenges beyond those experienced by 
traditional high-technology venture founders: they must finish creating the technology 
before they can begin using it (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Pisano, 2006). Academics 
typically start with inventions so immature that their commercial success cannot be 
predicted (Jensen and Thursby, 2001).  
 
Academic entrepreneurship is an emerging and developing phenomenon, and there is a 
growing body of literature about new ventures based on university academic. However, 
limited research has been directed toward nascent academic entrepreneurs (NAEs) to 
understand the key challenges of bringing innovations to market. The majority of this 
work has focused on the institutional experience rather than the academic 
entrepreneurs and their individual experiences (Rothaermel et al., 2007). Within the 
broader fields of entrepreneurship and innovation, it has been argued that high-potential 
startups such as academic ventures should receive particular attention from scholars 
(Davidsson and Gordon, 2011). The following research addressed this gap. 
 
Nascent academic entrepreneurship involves more than transforming an invention into a 
commercialized innovation. It is about the genesis of ideas and the emergence of 
opportunities, the birth of new organizations, their evolution into new companies, and 
the transformation of scientists into leaders. It also is about providing the foundation for 
future innovation by others. Though nascent academic entrepreneurship is increasing in 
frequency, it is not well understood. The dissertation examines this important topic. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this inductive multicase study was to examine and understand the 
process and key challenges faced by nascent academic entrepreneurs2 (NAEs) at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in transforming an idea or invention to 
initial commercialization, beginning with the initial inception of the idea. To understand 
the problem, this study focused on the following research question: what are the critical 
challenges experienced by NAEs in their emergence process? 
 
The Literature: Overview 
 
Nascent academic entrepreneurship is a new area of study. The literature that informed 
this research appears in two broad fields of study: innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Within the innovation domain, the focus area was on university spin-offs within the 
context of entrepreneurial universities. Within entrepreneurship, the focus was on the 
relatively new area of nascent entrepreneurship. The dissertation research is positioned 
at the intersection of these fields, as depicted in the conceptual schema shown in  
figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Topic positioning within literature. 
 
 
The dissertation reviews the literature starting with an examination of innovation and 
technological change, establishing why they are important to society. This establishes 
the foundation for a definition of innovation for the purposes of this study, as well as its 
relationship to science and invention. Understanding the process elements and 
timelines of moving from scientific discoveries to their widespread application provides 
important overall context for the study, which leads to the topic of entrepreneurial 
                                                          
2
 In this study, a nascent academic entrepreneur (NAE) is defined as a researcher at a university (faculty, 
staff, or student) who has left the university, or intends to leave, to devote full-time attention to the 
development of a company based upon research that originated at the university in which he or she was 
significantly, if not principally, involved, and who has not yet achieved repeating real economic activity 
from the sale of products or services based on that idea. 
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universities and the connection of these institutions to innovation, including how their 
role has evolved, current directions, and the debates surrounding these issues. 
Examining changes in regional and national innovation systems establishes a 
foundation for discussing the impact on universities and academics resulting in the 
growth of technology transfer via the creation of spin-off ventures. Narrowing in further, 
the review includes the relatively recent but growing literature concerning these 
university spin-offs (USOs) to establish their increasing significance and why they are 
different from other entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
Returning to the broad picture, this study also falls within the expansive area of 
entrepreneurship literature that has received scholarly attention from many disciplines. 
The focus of the review is on the dominant themes and debates most relevant to NAEs 
that emerge from the extant literature to provide a basis for focusing the research, 
including entrepreneurial opportunities, new organizations, and the individuals who 
create them. Within this area, the subtopic of nascent entrepreneurship in general is 
examined, particularly in relation to the dominant themes above and to establish that the 
study of emerging new ventures is not the same as existing young firms.  
 
The product of these examinations within the two broad domains of innovation and 
entrepreneurship culminates, and is integrated, in the review of the limited emerging 
literature on NAEs that lies at the intersection of all the previous topic areas. This is the 
focus of the study and establishes the basis for the research question.  
 
Research Approach 
 
Methodology. This study explored the development process of NAEs following the 
genesis of an idea through initial commercialization. This is a new area with limited 
previous research activity. The study used a longitudinal, multicase empirical approach 
that focused on building theory that emerged from the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
attributes of inductive inquiry elicit fresh understandings and it is well suited to 
entrepreneurship research and areas that have been little studied. A multiple-case 
design permitted a replication logic treating each case as an independent experiment 
(Yin, 1994). Data and theory were constantly compared and contrasted throughout the 
data collection and analysis process.  
 
Research setting. This study examined scientists who are academic entrepreneurs at 
MIT, recognized as one of the world’s leading educational institutions, consistently 
ranking at the top in many science and engineering disciplines (O’Shea et al., 2007). 
MIT also is recognized as an important driver of innovation by producing the academic 
research that underlies many important industrial innovations (Mansfield, 1995) and 
results in new firms and industries (National Research Council, 2012). MIT also has a 
long history as a leader in producing university spin-offs (Kordal et al., 2010; Shane, 
2004). 
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The researcher has unique access to a novel population of academic entrepreneurs 
pursuing spin-offs—those enrolled in the MIT Venture Mentoring Service (VMS) 
program—that otherwise would not be visible or accessible. A number of delimitations 
further set the scope for this study. First, participants were limited to academic 
entrepreneurs engaged with VMS because (a) this provided access to a normally 
invisible sample and (b) robust archival data was known to be available. Second, case 
participants were scientists who met the definition of NAEs as defined by the study. 
Third, the invention or discovery serving as the basis for the entrepreneurial effort was 
significant and novel. Finally, case participants were limited to first-time NAEs. 
 
At the time of conducting this study, the researcher had been employed for ten years at 
MIT as a VMS staff member. For this inquiry, the researcher brought practical 
experience and personal observation of many hundreds of prospective entrepreneurs 
as they navigated from idea toward operating a real firm, including many academic 
entrepreneurs. This experience gave the researcher distinct knowledge and 
understanding of the environment and context. 
 
Research sample. The study investigated as cases ten NAEs in eight academic 
ventures. The unit of analysis was the individual NAE founder. These cases spanned 
the life cycle from idea to commercialization in a wide range of technologies and 
industries. The research included multiple data collection methods such as interviews, 
longitudinal contemporaneous observations, and extensive archival data. Multiple 
informants also were used in each case. The study comprised thirty-four interviews with 
twenty-two informants and a review of more than 3,400 archival documents. Following 
Eisenhardt (1989), cases were selected on the basis of theoretical sampling, which 
introduced a deductive element in that cases were chosen one at a time and analyzed.  
 
Table 1 contains a summary of the NAEs and ventures, along with the status of the 
NAE at the time the venture idea was formed, the current or ending status of the 
venture, the number of staff employed, and a description of the outcome. The table 
includes the number of years spent in each phase the participant reached. 
 
As this information is potentially sensitive, the names of the participants and their 
ventures have been given pseudonyms. Quotes from participants have been altered 
only where necessary to ensure that their identities remain anonymous or where they 
have requested that certain confidential details not be included. 
 
Summary of Findings  
 
There were six major findings from the study. The researcher aimed to capture a broad 
range of experiences along with the participants’ perspectives to provide the reader with 
deep context for those experiences. The intent was to let the participants’ voices speak 
for themselves. Illustrative quotations taken from the interview transcripts present the 
varied perspectives of the participants and convey a sense of the richness and 
complexity of these experiences. The following tables provide a summary of the key 
elements of the findings along with a sample of representative quotes.  
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Finding 1: Many NAEs are students when they start their venture activities. 
Elements Results Comments 
Students are 
important pathways 
for USO formation 
9 out of 10 NAEs were students 
at initiation of venture idea  
In 7 out of 8 ventures, the technology resulted 
directly from students’ research. 
Representative quotes 
“I was interested in this topic because it had the potential to change the world for the better . . . I really 
threw myself entirely into this research. I mean, it did not escape me that I was at MIT in . . . arguably the 
best PhD program on the planet. This is not just a once in a lifetime experience, this is an experience that 
most people don’t get even once in their lifetime.” (Founder2, Beta Bio)  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of NAEs and ventures 
 
      
Years in phase 
NAE 
name 
Venture 
name 
Industry / 
discipline 
NAE 
Current / Ending 
Status 
Status / 
Outcome 
Idea RBSU* TBSU** Comm Total 
Founder
1 
Gamma 
Materials 
Materials / 
materials 
Student Idea / early science 
In progress / 
plan RBSU 
0.5 ‒ ‒ ‒ 0.5 
Founder
2 
Beta Bio 
Biotech / 
biology 
Student RBSU early science 
In progress / 
plan TBSU 
0.5 1 ‒ ‒ 1.5 
Founder
3 
Kappa AI 
Software / 
AI 
Student 
RBSU / attempting 
TBSU 
Failing 4 6 ‒ ‒ 10 
Founder
4 
Lambda 
Magnetics 
 
Magnetics / 
physics + 
materials 
Faculty 
RBSU / pre 
commercialization 
Failed 1 10 ‒ ‒ 11 
Founder
5 
Magnetics / 
physics + 
materials 
Student 
Founder
6 
Epsilon 
Energy 
Energy / 
chemical 
engineering 
Student 
TBSU / pre 
commercialization 
In progress / 
transitioning 
to TBSU 
1 8 1 ‒ 10 
Founder
7 
Alpha 
Chips 
Computing / 
physics 
Student 
TBSU / pre 
commercialization 
Intelligent 
outcome / 
acquisition 
2 7 1 ‒ 10 
Founder
8 
Delta 
Pharma 
Pharma / 
chemical 
engineering 
Student 
TBSU / pre 
commercialization 
Intelligent 
outcome / 
acquisition 
2 5 1 ‒ 8 
Founder
9 Zeta 
Web 
 
Software / 
signal 
analysis 
Student 
TBSU / post 
commercialization 
In progress / 
growth 
1 3 2 2 8 
Founder
10 
Software / 
NLP 
Student 
 
*  Research based startups 
** Technology based startups
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Finding 2: The first challenge that NAEs face is acting upon the idea of a venture and actually 
exploring it. 
Elements Results Comments 
Research motivations 
for NAE 
For 8 of 10 NAEs it was 
curiosity driven  
Primary motivation was finding an interesting 
scientific idea with potential for contribution to 
scientific knowledge. 
 
Recognizing potential 
impact and future 
applications 
 
When research results 
appeared promising, began 
considering future applications  
 
The dominant perception (8 out of 10 NAEs) 
was that somebody else would commercialize 
the technology.  
 
Openness to 
entrepreneurship 
 
Before initial venture idea, 9 of 
10 NAEs expected careers as 
professors and researchers.  
 
However, majority also were open to thoughts 
of entrepreneurship  
 
Idea formation and 
initiating exploration 
 
 
For 8 out of 10 NAEs, the idea 
formed as a result of thinking 
about future applications.  
 
Turned to local entrepreneurial 
ecosystem for advice on how to 
explore the options. 
 
Dominant perception at time was they were 
not committed, just curious about one possible 
option. 
 
Common steps taken to explore a) Spoke with 
peers seeking sources of advice. b) Enter 
business plan competition. c) Enroll in VMS. 
Representative quotes 
“I felt it was interesting scientifically and it could be a real contribution. You know, initially it was just 
seemed like it could be a really valuable contribution and would be a neat thing to do.” (Founder6, Epsilon 
Energy) 
“I imagined if we can figure this out, we will have nature papers and science papers and we’ll be famous 
scientists and that would be great. I didn’t know really anything about business or industry.” (Founder2, 
Beta Bio) 
“You know this probably sounds silly now and I think at the time we were rather naïve about the whole 
thing, but when you’re a student at MIT the coolest thing on campus is to start a company, right? We 
were talking about the business plan competition . . . and so we were trying to think of things that we 
might be able to do and this was the one idea that I had that I thought could be valuable.” (Founder6, 
Epsilon Energy) 
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Finding 3: One challenge is making the decision to launch a venture and an entrepreneurial 
commitment to it. 
Elements Results Comments 
Pressure testing the 
idea 
 
 
Using entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, especially business 
plan competitions, was critical 
for 8 out of 10 NAEs.  
Gained knowledge, understanding and 
evidence to pressure test their ideas and the 
marketplace. Confirmed belief that their 
technology is important with potential for 
impact. But initial business plan was not 
viable—did not fit real world or technology 
maturity. 
 
Best way for the 
technology to 
advance 
 
All student NAEs realized that 
their technology was too 
embryonic for either the 
marketplace or licensing to 
others. 
 
 
Primary motivation was technological gain, not 
economic. All concluded that best chance for 
their technology to advance was to form their 
own startup to finish the research or it would 
never be used. Their perception was that it 
was their responsibility or mission.  
 
Forcing the decision 
 
Most kept options open as long 
as possible until graduation 
before committing to launch. 
 
Understood that someone needed to be the 
driving entrepreneur to lead the startup. Four 
of the students had top-tier academic job 
offers they turned down. 
Representative quote 
“Part of it was that I was married to this thing for I guess four years at the time that I formed the basis of 
the technology, and then another year after that of PhD and trying to get off the ground. And I really felt 
that this technology had a great chance of success but I didn’t think that there was anyone else out there 
that could foster that. And I felt that if the things that I just said were true and that there was no way to 
license and there was no way to really continue in academia, then I felt—and that I wanted it to 
succeed—I sort of felt I was the leader of this venture by default in that if I didn’t do anything it would just 
sit there… I don’t think that anyone understood it intimately enough to take the reins and try to de-risk it 
the way that I could. So for me it wasn’t for any other reason than to give it a shot at success and I knew 
that there was a huge need for it.” (Founder8, Delta Pharma) 
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Finding 4: Ventures based on university research still on a lab bench start off in a science phase 
(RBSU) to continue the research, and this phase can last a long time.   
Elements Results Comments 
Start as RBSU due to 
embryonic nature of 
technology 
All participants realized much 
more development needed to 
reach commercialization. 
All noted the first phase was to do more 
research to understand the science. 
 
Moving from 
academic to 
commercial research 
 
 
 
All encountered differences in 
how academic versus real-
world research is done. 
 
Examples: academic research designed to 
demonstrate for publication; organization is 
different; leadership to make a team versus 
independent research. 
Takes many 
resources 
 
All found they required more 
people and funding to achieve 
the critical mass needed to 
progress. 
In research phase, most grew to between 12 
and 40 people (mostly PhDs and researchers, 
few business people). Collectively, all NAEs 
raised over $70M for research phase. 
 
Still a science project 
 
 
Participants frequently 
encountered new science 
questions and fundamental 
flaws as they progressed. 
 
Moving from lab bench proof of principle to 
large scale real-world applications needed for 
commercialization. 
 
RBSU phase takes a 
long time 
 
NAEs spent the most time in 
this phase, requiring up to 10 
years. 
 
This was far longer than originally anticipated 
for any of the NAEs. 
Representative quotes 
“And we were working on the technology but it was very slow going. You know, we were trying a lot of 
different things, very few of them worked or showed any kind of progress and so . . . I don’t want to say 
we were naïve about it, but I would say that the literature on this subject was very misleading in that they 
had demonstrated protein splices in all of these model systems, and those model systems were really 
designed specifically to demonstrate protein splicing. So that was a big challenge for us.” (Founder6, 
Epsilon Energy) 
“The biggest problem was that I didn’t realize that time matters and speed matters. And the [grant] money 
I collected was designed for very low speed.” (Founder3, Kappa AI) 
“I thought that a startup would probably be the necessary vehicle because just looking at the resources I 
figured it was going to need a 10 to 20 person team for like 3 to 5 years to make it real.” (Founder7, Alpha 
Chips) 
“And then we realized that there was a fundamental flaw in one of the components of the system and that 
we could only really have known when we went to large animal studies.” (Founder8, Delta Pharma) 
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Finding 5: To achieve commercialization, the venture must transition from the research phase into 
the form of a typical technology-based startup (TBSU). 
Elements Results Comments 
Moving from the 
RBSU to TBSU 
phase  
 
The NAEs in 6 ventures had 
reached a point where they 
had, or tried to, transition from 
research to building a product 
or service to commercialize. 
The NAEs in 4 ventures were 
successful in this transition.  
 
Three NAEs (in 2 ventures) 
were not successful. 
The 4 ventures that did transition experienced 
changes in several key aspects: a) Views of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. b) Configuration 
of the organization and its resources. c) The 
role and perspectives of the NAE founders. 
 
 
 
The NAEs for the 2 that failed related very 
different experiences for the same aspects. 
Views of opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Successful: 
In RBSU, focused on 
technology target, not 
customers. Engaged with 
customers to keep confirming 
the technology requirements. 
 
To transition to TBSU, identified 
new entrepreneurial 
opportunities, as if launching 
new tech venture. 
 
Unsuccessful: 
In RBSU, did not begin with 
clearly identified technology 
target derived from viable 
business opportunities. 
 
Little to keep pace with market 
or identify business 
opportunities. 
 
Used initial viable future opportunities from 
exploration phase to form technological view 
of required target. Provided performance and 
other factors required to marketability 
envelope. 
 
Some similarity to initial, but redefined and 
adapted from deeper understanding and in 
response to other technological and market 
changes. 
 
 
Weak exploration phase for both ventures, 
limited identification of viable markets and no 
technological target defined. No actions to 
seriously pursue a product. 
 
Became stuck in RBSU. NAEs came to view 
getting more research grants as the 
opportunity.  
Organizational 
configuration and 
resources  
 
 
 
 
Successful: 
To transition, two key areas 
saw change: composition of 
team and funding sources. Both 
needed active advanced 
planning and effort. 
 
Unsuccessful: 
No change in these two areas. 
 
NAEs acted to change team from just 
researchers to a customer-facing and selling 
organization with mix of staff. Funding 
changed from grants and friendly angels to 
professional institutional investors.  
 
 
Team did not change. No success in changing 
from grants to equity investors. Little planning 
or effort. 
Role and 
perspectives of the 
NAE founders 
 
Successful: 
Based on planned outcomes, 
made decision about remaining 
CEO or finding industry 
professional. 
 
Unsuccessful: 
NAEs remained as CEO. 
 
NAEs planning to reach commercialization 
and then grow did recruit experienced CEO. 
NAEs expecting to be acquired before product 
released remained as CEO. 
  
 
Founder3 did recruit a CEO very late, but 
when virtually out of financial resources. 
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Finding 6: NAEs may face a number of potentially serious conflicts. 
Elements Results Comments 
Conflicts with faculty 
 
NAEs of 3 ventures had serious 
conflicts arise with their faculty 
advisors. 
 
 
Founder8, while a student, was 
negotiating equity split of 
venture with advisor. 
 
 
Founder2, as student, had 
major intellectual property and 
relationship issues with advisor. 
 
 
Founder1, currently a student, 
has an advisor involved in the 
venture idea. 
 
The other 7 NAEs graduated 
before forming a company. 
Clear policies exist concerning conflicts of 
interest that prohibit faculty and the students 
they supervise from being involved in a 
business together. 
 
NAE described “haggling over equity” with the 
same person who would decide if he got his 
PhD. Worked out without becoming major 
issue. 
 
NAE reached point where advisor could not 
talk to him anymore and he could not get a 
license to the technology of which he was 
principal inventor. 
 
NAE and advisor have good relationship, but 
as NAE intends to launch before graduating, 
he will take leave from PhD program. 
 
Did not have conflicts with faculty over venture 
or technology, received necessary licensing. 
Representative quotes 
“He believed I was trying to deceive him, or somehow rob him of his rightful share of equity, by being 
reluctant to discuss equity while I was his student.” (Founder2, Beta Bio)  
“I would love to stay and get my PhD. . . But there are just so many things that wouldn’t work out . . . I 
need to take a leave . . . I’m not going to finish this last year, I don’t think.” (Founder1, Gamma Materials) 
Elements Results Comments 
Conflicts arising from 
business plan 
competitions (BPC). 
 
 
 
 
NAEs of 3 ventures had 
conflicts develop with team 
members from the competition. 
 
Founder8 was sued by an MBA 
student from another university 
who was on his BPC. team. 
 
 
Founder6 had some potentially 
significant issues with MBA 
students on BPC team.  
 
Founder1’s BPC team was 
fellow researchers, had 
problems when deciding to 
launch. 
There are many BPCs in the area and 
nationally these NAEs may enter. They are 
increasingly popular.  
 
One MBA student sued him, days before he 
even graduated. Almost took company down 
before it even started. Years later, court threw 
it out. 
 
Threats were made by MBA students. NAE 
was able to resolve relatively satisfactorily.  
 
 
Made equity split at start of BPC, however not 
everyone planned to actually join venture. 
Fixing it created significant stress and 
difficulties. 
Representative quotes 
“I’ve heard a lot of stories and ours wasn’t really all that bad . . . But I’ve heard of some total horror stories 
from competition.” (Founder6, Epsilon Energy) 
“They tell you to make a founder’s agreement in the competition. We learned it’s not a good idea. . . . You 
know nothing at that point and . . . all that does is set expectations that should’ve never been set. We’re 
fixing it, but . . . no matter what, we’re going to end up destroying friendships and relationships.” 
(Founder1, Gamma Materials) 
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Conclusions  
 
Academic ventures are different. A major finding of this research is that, in contrast to 
regular high-technology startups that take existing technologies and combine them in 
novel ways to create new products, ventures based on discoveries originating from a 
lab bench must first demonstrate that the technology development is complete prior to 
its marketability. A conclusion drawn was that academic ventures launch as RBSUs with 
the mission of maturing an embryonic technology before reaching the same point as a 
regular TBSU. The RBSU phase is distinct, has unique challenges, and differs from the 
startup process typical high-technology ventures follow. The findings also indicated that 
academic ventures spend years in this research mode, more time than any other phase. 
A further and related conclusion is that the challenges NAEs face can be exacerbated if 
nascent academic ventures are treated as though they are typical high-technology 
startups. For example, the local entrepreneurial ecosystem may include mechanisms 
such as business plan competitions and a variety of other support programs for new 
ventures. However, the unique needs of an NAE in the idea exploration or RBSU phase 
may require a very different set of advice or actions than a typical new technology 
startup, and the support programs may not be geared to identify and differentiate 
between the types of startups. This can lead to incorrect or potentially even damaging 
assistance as the NAEs attempt to navigate these offerings to obtain the information 
and learning they need to make good and appropriate decisions concerning their 
venture. 
 
Perceptions of opportunities. A second key finding of the study was that the decision 
to launch an academic venture as an RBSU was driven principally by the perception of 
technological gain, which can be described as the belief that there is real potential for a 
significant innovation. Nascent academic entrepreneurs believe that the only effective 
path to advance their embryonic technology to maturity is to form their own startup and 
direct further development themselves. A conclusion drawn was that exploiting 
technological opportunities, not entrepreneurial opportunities, is what initially motivates 
NAEs to create academic ventures. This drive to take early promising results on a lab 
bench and continue to build a useful technology to the point at which it can be applied 
practically is one of the distinct characteristics of the RBSU phase. A related conclusion 
is that identifying a clear and viable entrepreneurial opportunity is necessary to 
successfully transition to the TBSU phase and to commercialize the technology—posing 
another key challenge, as NAEs must undergo a shift in their perspectives as the 
technology develops. A further conclusion is that invention and development of new 
technologies creates a range of entirely new future entrepreneurial opportunities, many 
of which may not be clearly visible. The challenge for NAEs is to identify those 
opportunities their venture can successfully exploit in the near term and learn how best 
to enable themselves and other entrepreneurs to discover and pursue other 
opportunities in the future. 
 
Process experienced by NAEs. The findings also indicated that by viewing the venture 
development process from a technological perspective, NAEs proceed through several 
distinct phases from idea genesis to reaching the marketplace. Starting from academic 
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research, NAEs first go through the idea exploration phase, then the RBSU and TBSU 
phases, before achieving commercialization. Each of these is different in terms of 
objectives, views of opportunities, structure, resources needed, funding sources, and 
the role of the NAE. A conclusion drawn is that at each phase the nascent academic 
venture is different in configuration and focus, and successfully transitioning from one to 
the next produces significant challenges in recognizing the changes needed at each 
time and executing them. A further conclusion is that the transition from RBSU to TBSU 
is the most critical and challenging. The findings also indicated that NAEs who fail to 
identify a clear entrepreneurial opportunity and do not act to reconfigure the nascent 
venture may find themselves stuck in the RBSU phase—not a permanently sustainable 
state—in which they exhaust their available financial resources and are forced to 
terminate the venture. 
 
Students as NAEs. A significant finding of this research was that the majority of NAEs 
in this study were students at the time they formed the initial idea and began exploring 
the possibility of a venture based on their research activities. A conclusion drawn was 
that students as academic entrepreneurs are an important pathway for transferring 
technologies from universities to the marketplace. The findings also indicated that the 
exploration phase is critically important in supplanting NAEs’ prior plans for academic or 
research careers in several ways: (1) by giving them confidence in their abilities as 
entrepreneurs and business leaders; (2) by providing them with sufficient evidence that 
their technology could be the basis of a viable business in the future; (3) by helping 
them gain an understanding of the full requirements, capabilities, and maturity level 
needed by their technology to address those opportunities; and (4) by enabling them to 
assess the current state of their technology relative to the requirements. That 
assessment generally leads to the realization that the technology is embryonic and 
unlikely to be licensed effectively by anyone else. A conclusion drawn from these 
findings was that the path from lab bench to launching an academic venture may be 
more serendipitous than deliberate. This part of their journey is, especially, a process of 
discovery. A further conclusion is that business plan competitions are extremely 
important in providing a mechanism and structure for this discovery, though perhaps not 
entirely in the ways expected. Competitions tend to promote an image that the ventures 
are ready to go as operating businesses and judge the entrants based on their 
compelling market story and whether they are attractive to venture investors. An 
additional conclusion was that as academic and research career options become 
increasingly limited, greater numbers of students likely will be exploring and potentially 
launching academic ventures as NAEs.  
 
NAEs experience conflicts. The findings indicated two particular areas where 
potentially serious conflicts can arise early in the academic venture emergence process. 
The first was unique to student NAEs and academic ventures, and related to students’ 
conflicts with their faculty advisors. Although institutional policies may prohibit faculty 
from entering into business relationships with current students, it sometimes happens. A 
conclusion drawn was that students who form companies and launch ventures before 
graduation expose themselves to the potential for a serious conflict. Different personal 
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goals as well as mismatched expectations about roles and ownership interests can lead 
to particularly difficult situations. 
 
The second area of potential conflict involved team members from business plan 
competitions, and a conclusion drawn was that NAEs may enter and leave a 
competition with very different expectations for the path to be taken than their other 
team members. Although this variance could happen to any team entering the 
competition, NAEs may be more likely to run into issues because typical technology-
based ventures may be able to actually move directly to a typical startup (TBSU), while 
academic ventures likely will find themselves first spending years to finish creating the 
science before they can begin using it. A further conclusion was that these differences 
in expectation are heightened when business school students are part of the team 
because their goals are more likely to include starting a TBSU right away. 
 
Both of the previous conflict areas led to two additional conclusions. The first conclusion 
was that there is some dissonance in the messages communicated to NAEs and other 
stakeholders that increases the possibility of serious conflicts arising from mismatched 
expectations. For example, students clearly are key targets as participants in business 
plan competitions. However, some competitions’ rules either directly state or imply that 
a company must exist to receive a prize. Another influence is the message that 
entrepreneurship is heavily encouraged as an option for students, but some faculty 
members may not be fully aware of all the policies that may affect students seeking to 
start new ventures. Second, a growing “hype cycle” promoting entrepreneurship that 
reaches students leads to the further conclusion that these conflicts are likely to 
increase in frequency absent some solutions. 
 
Reconceptualization of the Academic Venture Emergence Process 
 
The study supported a reconceptualization of the academic venture emergence 
process. The results of this study reveal that almost all of the participants followed a 
technology maturity development process rather than one based on business 
development of entrepreneurial opportunities, in contrast to prior literature. This 
technological perspective provides a simpler and cleaner explanation of the process 
followed by NAEs. 
 
The process begins with the researcher conducting academic research that yields a 
potentially significant discovery. Next, the idea of a potential venture is explored to 
develop evidence of possible future opportunities and their technology requirements. 
Then an academic venture is launched to finish creating technology as an RBSU. When 
the technology is ready, the venture transitions into a TBSU to exploit a specific initial 
commercialization opportunity. The possible outcomes include commercialization, 
licensing, acquisition, intelligent exits, and forced terminations. Other than 
commercialization, any of the other outcomes are possible at any phase.  
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Figure 2. Academic venture emergence process framework. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Academic venture and NAE characteristics at each phase  
 Phases 
Characteristics Academic research Idea exploration RBSU TBSU 
Technology 
maturity 
Create knowledge 
Too embryonic for 
use or licensing 
Finish creating  
the technology 
Begin using the 
technology 
Entrepreneurial 
opportunities 
Scientific discoveries 
create possibility of 
future opportunities 
Evidence for belief 
some opportunities 
are possible and 
valuable 
Monitor for 
changes in 
possible 
opportunities 
Identify a specific 
initial 
commercialization 
opportunity 
 
Technological 
opportunities 
Discover, publish, 
patent 
Understand 
technology 
requirements to 
satisfy 
entrepreneurial 
opportunity 
Continue research 
to satisfy 
requirements of 
entrepreneurial 
opportunity 
Adapt and embody 
technology in initial 
commercialization 
opportunity 
Organization  Academic lab 
Ad hoc/ temporary 
project 
R&D lab Product company 
People Academics 
Part-time, ad hoc/ 
ecosystem 
Mostly scientists 
and researchers 
Mix of researchers 
and business / 
customer-facing 
people 
Funding Sponsored research 
Personal, friends and 
family 
Grants, investment 
from nonstrangers 
Investment from 
strangers 
NAE role Researcher 
Researcher and 
project leader 
R&D Leader 
Decide on role, 
business or technical 
leader 
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Extending the framework with more detail, Table 2 provides a description of the 
characteristics of the academic venture and the NAE at each phase until reaching an 
outcome. This table may be helpful in two ways for academic entrepreneurs and those 
advising them. First, it provides assistance in performing an assessment to identify the 
current phase of the NAE and his or her venture. Second, it helps identify the key 
concerns they should focus on within each phase and provides a view of the changes 
necessary to prepare to transition to the next phase. 
 
Limitations of the Study. Some caution is offered as this study was subject to a 
number of limitations, some of which are common to qualitative research in general and 
others of which are a result of the study design. These include: (a) the study is based on 
a small sample that was purposefully chosen; (b) qualitative studies are subject to 
researcher bias; (c) the findings may not be generalizable to repeat or frequent 
academic entrepreneurs; and (d) the findings may not be generalizable to other settings 
beyond MIT. Consideration was given to methods of identifying these limitations and 
minimizing their impact. These are discussed in the dissertation. It should also be noted 
that the study is strengthened by utilizing multiple sources of data; in particular, the use 
of deep archival data that includes contemporaneously recorded observations of the 
NAEs over the lifetime of their ventures. 
 
Implications for Management Theory 
 
The results of this study add to management knowledge in several areas within the 
broader streams of literature in the fields of innovation and entrepreneurship. In 
particular, this study of NAEs is positioned at the intersection of USOs and nascent 
entrepreneurship, adding to the literature in both. This study also adds to the literature 
concerning entrepreneurial opportunities within entrepreneurship and to the stream 
covering entrepreneurial universities. 
 
This research found that NAEs launch in a specific and distinct organizational phase 
unique to academic ventures called the RBSU, which is focused on continuing the 
research needed to develop the technology to the point where it can be used in 
products. At that point, the academic venture must transition to the TBSU phase which 
is the place where typical high-technology startups launch. Prior studies of the 
emergence process of USOs do not differentiate between these two phases and 
present a single stage which is driven by developing previously identified business 
opportunities. For example, Vohora, Wright, and Lockett (2004) term it the “re-
orientation phase.” Others call it “stage three” (Ndonzuau et al., 2002), “post-startup” 
(Rasmussen, 2011), or simply “startup” (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). While these 
studies recognize that academic ventures experience additional research and 
development, the research largely is treated as an appendage, with the focus placed on 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This study adds to the literature on university spinoffs and 
academic entrepreneurship by contributing a reconceptualized process model for NAEs, 
as well as propositions that the nature, purpose, and challenges of emerging academic 
ventures are different at each phase. By framing the phases by the maturity level of the  
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technology instead of by business opportunities, the new model reflects a simpler 
process with fewer stages and eliminates many of the iterations across stages found in 
the previous studies.  
 
The study also adds new knowledge about the duration of the emergence process 
phases, including that the RBSU phase is the longest. The NAEs in this study spent an 
average of over nine years from initial exploration of the venture idea to reaching an 
outcome. Of that time, more than 68 percent was spent in the RBSU phase. This 
extends the literature on university spinoffs and also on innovation, as prior research 
has shown that initial commercialization takes a long time (e.g. Golder et al., 2009), 
while studies on the academic venture process are relatively silent on the duration of 
each phase (e.g. Rasmussen et al., 2011; Vohora et al., 2004).  
 
Furthermore, the study adds insight on funding sources, particularly during the long 
RBSU phase. The NAEs collectively raised about $120 million in financing through 
grants and equity investment. Of this, over $70 million was raised before the TBSU 
phase and over 80 percent came from various grants, such as the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program. This adds to the literature on public funding of 
innovation and on a recognized funding gap between scientific invention and 
commercialization often referred to as the “valley of death” (Barr et al., 2009).  
 
Additionally, this work adds to research on entrepreneurial opportunities, a central issue 
in the entrepreneurship literature, in several ways. First, there is considerable debate 
about whether opportunities are created, a Schumpeterian view, or discovered, a 
Kirznerian perspective. In all but one case in this study, the technology was the result of 
a discovery through research by a PhD student. The study demonstrates that a range of 
potential entrepreneurial opportunities sprang into existence at the moment the new 
technology was invented. This adds to the literature by providing insights into the 
genesis of technology-based opportunities. Additionally, the findings provide additional 
support to Stokes’s (1997) proposition that scientists can be driven by both the quest for 
fundamental knowledge and the pursuit of future practical applications of that 
knowledge. 
 
Next, the study also found that the NAEs in seven out of eight academic ventures 
primarily were motivated by scientific goals and technological opportunities in their 
decision to launch startups based on their research. They all concluded that the 
technology could not yet be effectively used or licensed by others, and that unless they 
started a venture to continue to advance the research, it would never see the light of 
day. They all believed they were the only ones that could do it—that it was their 
responsibility. They also described a desire to see how far the science could evolve. At 
that point in the process, the participants described economic gain as further down the 
list of drivers: not completely out of mind, but not a key determinant. This is in contrast 
to the conventional view that individuals become entrepreneurs to exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities for economic gain (e.g. Cassar, 2007; Shane, 2004; 
Schumpeter, 1934). The study did find that NAEs later must shift to adopt this view and 
target specific market opportunities to successfully transition to the TBSU phase and 
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reach commercialization. However, the initial driver of scientific curiosity was not 
extinguished, as reflected in a comment by Founder7 made after he had led his venture 
to an extremely successful outcome: “Someday, somebody will have to run this place 
who just wants to, like, make some money, and I’ll probably just keep being the curious 
guy.” Hayter (2011) and Lam (2011) found that scientists considering startups may be 
driven by varied goals, with personal financial rewards as a minor and secondary 
consideration. This study extends those findings by illuminating how the motivations of 
NAEs may evolve and how they arrive at their decisions.  
 
This research also found that nine of the ten NAEs were students when they began their 
venture activities suggesting that students are a significant vector for academic venture 
creation. This is in contrast to much prior literature that indicated that faculty are the 
dominant actors creating academic ventures. Although there is strong evidence for the 
entrepreneurial involvement of faculty in creating many ventures, being entrepreneurial 
is not the same as being the driving entrepreneur responsible each day for moving the 
academic venture forward. This requires a full-time commitment. The intention here is 
not to diminish the importance of faculty entrepreneurship, but rather to uncover and 
explore the experiences and challenges faced by certain academics that do act on their 
ideas and intentions and become committed to driving the idea forward. By adding two 
words to the definition of an NAE—full time—the study was able to look at an important 
population that had received little attention. These findings provided support for recent 
studies that had questioned the role of faculty in academic ventures, such as those by 
Boh et al. (2012) and Astebro et al. (2012), adding to the literature on USOs. The data 
also revealed that serious conflicts between student NAEs and faculty can arise, as well 
as among team members. These issues and the surrounding circumstances have 
received limited research, and this study adds to the conversation concerning 
entrepreneurial universities and academic capitalism. 
 
Practical Implications 
 
This study indicated that NAEs face a different process and additional challenges in 
their ventures compared to regular TBSUs. The researcher offers the following practical 
insights drawn from a better understanding of the major issues, questions, and inflection 
points these inventors encountered in their journeys: (a) that prospective and current 
academic entrepreneurs can make more informed decisions leading to more effective 
and efficient venture outcomes, and (b) that policymakers and institutions may be able 
to structure resources more appropriately to support any unique needs of NAEs. 
 
Practical implications for management. Academics who either are contemplating a 
startup or currently engaged in an emerging venture based on their university research 
may achieve superior outcomes from a better understanding of the process and the 
sequence of key challenges. First, they may be able to calibrate their expectations 
about the process and their efforts better before starting. Second, this knowledge may 
help them be both more effective and efficient in the use of their available resources. 
Third, they will be more likely to reach an informed and desired outcome—even if it is 
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abandoning the effort—as opposed to continuing until the venture fails due to running 
out of resources. NAEs should consider the following: 
 
1. Recognize that science-based ventures are different from regular high-tech 
startups and understand the phases, as well as their current status in the 
sequence. NAEs should concentrate their time, energy, and resources on the key 
objectives within each phase in order to extend their runway as long as possible. 
For example, to find funding, efforts should be focused on the most likely sources 
within that phase. 
2. At the outset, NAEs should use the available entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
especially resources such as business plan competitions and mentoring, to fully 
explore the venture idea and learn about the entrepreneurial process, become 
familiar with business thinking, and gather evidence to validate the likely 
existence of future entrepreneurial opportunities. 
3. More importantly, NAEs should use that information to understand requirements 
relative to their technology regarding performance, maturity, and capabilities 
needed to satisfy those potential applications. This will enable them to assess the 
gap between the technology’s current state and the target to define the additional 
research work needed. 
4. NAEs should understand that when they launch, they first will start off in the 
RBSU phase, during which they will need to continue to do the research in order 
to advance the technology to those targets. They should expect and plan that the 
RBSU phase likely will span a number of years and probably take longer than 
expected at the outset. 
5. During the RBSU phase, the NAEs should get out of their labs and offices and 
engage with the market and potential customers. Not in a sales mode, as they 
won’t have a product yet, but to remain connected to the technology targets and 
monitor other changes affecting customers. They should recognize that the 
opportunities identified during idea exploration likely will not be the ones 
eventually exploited, as the market and other technologies will have evolved. 
However, the technological targets will lead them to emerging new opportunities 
that they can exploit. 
6. Recognize that the transition from research as an RBSU to becoming a product 
company as a TBSU will be a major challenge, as this shift requires both 
significant reconfiguration of the venture’s resources and organizational change 
in multiple respects. This will require careful advance planning and effort along 
with strong leadership, since major tensions can be expected. 
7. NAEs should make sure to carefully discuss and agree on expectations with any 
prospective team members, including those participating in a business plan 
competition. NAEs who are students should understand the potential unique 
conflicts that may arise and proactively find ways to prevent them. One way is to 
continue to work toward a venture but hold off on creating a company and 
launching the startup until after graduation. 
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Practical implications for policymakers and institutions. Universities are 
increasingly facing societal demands to become more entrepreneurial and serve as vital 
engines of economic progress. This trend also has been driving an increase in scholarly 
research concerning the roles and contributions universities play at many levels. Early 
research tended to focus on institutional and policy-level activities at the macro level. 
However, there is increasing focus at the micro level, such as the role of individuals like 
the academic entrepreneur, to understand how broader policies impact actual firms and 
individuals. The findings from this research fit this trend in a number of key respects: 
First, by illuminating how important early stage support mechanisms are in enabling the 
NAE to acquire the learning, confidence, and market evidence needed to make an 
informed commitment to launching an academic venture. Second, by explaining how 
NAEs can use early market information to identify the additional research needed to 
meet product requirements. Third, by demonstrating how critical public funding is to 
advance these technologies in the early stages. Fourth, by revealing that students are a 
significant pathway for new science-based venture creation. Finally, by forewarning that 
NAEs and other stakeholders may encounter conflicts. 
 
University faculty and leadership, including directors of support programs and activities 
that serve NAEs, should consider the following to improve technology transfer through 
entrepreneurship and reduce potential conflicts: 
 
1. Trends indicate a continuing increase in science-based academic ventures. 
Furthermore, environmental forces such as declining academic career options, 
along with an oversupply of PhD graduates, likely will mean greater numbers of 
students leading these startups. Universities and other officials should prepare by 
reviewing and evaluating objectives, policies, and procedures specifically related 
to student entrepreneurship to ensure desired outcomes are supported. 
2. Recognize that science-based ventures are different than regular high-tech 
startups. They do not start with the same issues and challenges, and therefore 
the guidance that NAEs need is different. Policies and support mechanisms 
should not conflate the two, but rather should be designed to identify NAEs and 
deliver assistance targeted to their requirements. Programs should evaluate 
whether additional or different resources are needed to support NAEs. 
3. NAEs obtain information and guidance from multiple sources, both formal and 
informal. Some of these may be external to the university. The guidance may not 
always be consistent. The development of a clear set of unified policies and 
principles communicated to guide all parties including students, faculty, 
administrators, and leadership would help increase clarity and transparency. This 
includes helping NAEs understand all intellectual property issues and the 
licensing process to properly align their expectations. One mechanism to 
consider is a regularly scheduled seminar open to all potential NAEs wherein 
these topics are presented and discussed. 
4. The findings suggest that the idea exploration process is critical in providing the 
learning and evidence needed for students to alter their career plans and commit 
to creating new ventures. Universities should identify ways for NAEs to 
participate in events and activities allowing them to fully explore and develop 
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their ideas without having to form a company or make ownership, equity splitting, 
and role decisions before they are ready or graduate. A related recommendation 
is to investigate potential methods for including ways to obtain options, even if 
nonexclusive, to licenses for their technology during this period. Reducing the 
barriers for NAEs to investigate their ideas likely would lead to increased 
innovation based on university technologies. 
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